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DELEGATION OF INVESTMENT
POWERS BY CHARITABLE TRUSTEES
Over the past few years the activities of philanthropic organizations'
have been undergoing considerable critical scrutiny. Congressional com-
mittees," private commissions," and individuals4 have extensively analyzed
institutionalized charity. An area of particular concern involves problems
created by the investment policies of charitable organizations.; One in-
vestment problem that has not received much attention, however, is the
plight of the natural person trustee of a charitable trust6 who, in general,
is legally prohibited from delegating his responsibility for investment of
trust funds.7 Almost one-third of all charitable foundations take the legal
form of trusts., Of the foundations organized as charitable trusts,!' over
60 percent are administered by natural person trustees.' Therefore, any
investment problem of the natural person trustee, such as an inability to
delegate investment responsibility, is faced by the great majority of char-
itable trusts. The economic effect of poor investment policy is significant
1 The term "philanthropic organization" is used here rather than "foundation" be-
cause of the differing meanings of the latter. See Pifer, Assessment of the Law and Its
Effect on Foundations, in 1 FOUNDATIONS AND THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969 41
(1970). Whenever the term "foundation" is used, it refers to the definition in Section
509(a) of the INTERNAL REVENUE CODE of 1954.
2 See Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before the Senate Conn. on Finance, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 6 (1969); Hearings on the Subject of Tax Reform Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Tax Reform Hearings].
:3 See COMM'N ON FOUNDATIONS AND PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY, FOUNDATIONS, PRI-
VATE GIVING AND PUBLIC POLICY (1970) [hereinafter cited as COMM'N ON FOUNDA-
TIONS].
4 See M. FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT (1965); D. YOUNG &
W. MOORE, TRUSTEESHIP AND THE MANAGEMENT OF FOUNDATIONS (1969).
5 Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 2, at 23-24 (testimony of Rep. Wright Patman).
6 See Part II infra.
7 See notes 19-29 and accompanying text infra.
S FOUNDATION DIRECTORY 13 (3d ed. M. Lewis 1967) [hereinafter cited as FOUNDA-
TION DIRECTORY]. This percentage has remained approximately the same since 1919.
Id.
9 A charitable organization may take two forms. The donor may choose either the
trust or the corporate structure to administer his gift. The charitable trust is the focus
of this article since almost all states presently permit nonprofit corporations to dele-
gate investment matters. See Committee on Charitable Trusts, Duties of Charitable
Trust Trustees and Charitable Corporation Directors, in 2 ABA REAL PROPERTY,
PROBATE AND TRUST J. 545, 558, n.98 (1967). A charitable trust is defined as
a fiduciary relationship with respect to property arising as a result of a
manifestation of an intention to create it and subjecting the person by
whom the property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property
for a charitable purpose.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 438 (1959).
10 For example, in the state of New York, over 60 percent of charitable trusts are
administered by natural person trustees. See FOUNDATION DIRECTORY, supra note 8, at
493-742.
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since "each percentage point of added total return on foundation invest-
ments would yield between two and three hundred million dollars of addi-
tional funds for charity.""1 The ultimate loser is society, since smaller re-
turn on investment means a smaller payout for charitable purposes.12
Private foundations can no longer resign themselves to a low invest-
ment yield resulting from a lack of investment expertise. The Tax Re-
form Act of 1969"3 has made maximum investment yield and a high rate
of income distribution imperative, for an inefficient investment policy now
subjects the charitable trust to a prohibitive tax burden.14 Thus, not only
society's interest, but also the continued functioning of the charitable trust
necessitates expert and aggressive management of the trust's principal and
income by the trustees. Refusal to allow the charitable trustees to del-
egate their investment responsibilities to knowledgeable investment counsel
could impede efficient management.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
American common law evolved two rules governing the investment
practices of the natural person trustee. One of these was the "prudent
man rule." The original statement of the rule appeared in Harvard Col-
lege v. Amory," a case involving a charitable remainder trust. The trus-
tees were given discretion either to lend the money or invest it in stocks.
They chose to invest it. Subsequently, the stocks that had been purchased
declined in value, and the charitable beneficiaries sued the surviving trus-
tee for breach of fiduciary duty and sought to have him surcharged. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court refused to allow the beneficiaries'
suit, holding that a trustee need only exercise the discretion that a prudent
man would ordinarily employ in the management of his own business af-
fairs.16 This statement of law has remained largely unchanged in Amer-
ica 17 and is widely accepted. Forty states have now adopted the rule,
either by statute or by judicial decision.' 8
Common law also developed the rule that any delegation by the trustee
11 COMM'N ON FOUNDATIONS, supra note 3, at 75.
12 Id. at 76.
13 83 Stat. 487 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
14 See notes 44-62 and accompanying text in/ra.
15 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830).
16 Writing for the court, Justice Putnam stated that:
All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall conduct
himself faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is to observe
how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence manage their own
affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent dis-
position of their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the
probable safety of the capital to be invested.
26 Mass. at 461. Thus, a trustee's prudent investment involves a consideration of
both the long and the short term needs of the trust. See generally G. BOGERT, TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES, §§ 396, 612 (1960).
'7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 379(a), at 174 (1959).
18 G. BOGERT, supra note 16, § 612, at 55 n.18 (Supp. 1973).
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of his investment function was impermissible."' The leading American
decision, Winthrop v. Attorney General,20 like A mory, arose out of a
dispute concerning a charitable trust created for Harvard University. The
trustees, rather than investing the money themselves, made an agreement
with the President and Fellows of the University that the trust monies
were to be placed in the Harvard general fund and invested and admin-
istered with it. The delegation agreement specifically provided that the
trustees were not to interfere with the University's management of the
investments. The court invalidated this agreement for three reasons. First,
it held that the delegation of investment power violated the settlor's intent
since the trust instrument evidenced the desire that "the care and manage-
ment of the principal of the fund, as well as the income, should be per-
manently in the trustees. '21 Second, the court found that the trustees
failed to show that it was impossible to carry out the trust in the way the
settlor had specified. Therefore, this was not a proper case for the exercise
of the judicial power to modify trust instruments, cy pres.2 2 Finally, the
court held that even though the trustees acted as prudent men would have
done in administering their own affairs, this delegation was "a disposition
which the trustees are not at liberty to make."' 23 Thus, in essence, the
Supreme Judicial Court overrode the prudent man rule of Harvard Col-
lege v. Amory in so far as prudence would dictate delegation of the trus-
tees' investment responsibilities.
Other courts have come to the same conclusion about the nondelegabil-
ity of trustee investment powers, although employing a different analysis.
These courts draw a distinction between duties of a trustee which are
discretionary and those which are ministerial ;24 the latter may be del-
egated, but the former may not. Selection of investments is always found
to be discretionary. The validity of this distinction has been criticized, 25
but it continues to be used by the courts. 26 Still other courts anchor their
rule of nondelegability upon the principle that the trustee himself should
perform all tasks that he can reasonably be expected to do.2 7 This prin-
ciple is essentially an application of the prudent man rule to the issue of
delegation, even though the rule originated in the context of investment
19 Although Rowland v. Witherden, 42 Eng. Rep. 379 (Ch. 1851), holds only that
a trustee is liable for negligent supervision of an agent's investments, it is now read
as an absolute prohibition against the trustee's delegation of investment selection.
See A. ScoTT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 171.2 (6th ed. 1970).
20 128 Mass. 258 (1880).
21 Id. at 261.
22 Id. at 261.
2 3 Id. at 262.
24 See, e.g., Turnbull v. Pomeroy, 140 Mass. 117, 3 N.E. 15 (1886); Belding v.
Archer, 131 N.C. 287, 42 S.E. 800 (1902). See also G. BOGERT, supra note 16, § 555,
n.46 and cases cited therein.
25 G. BOGERT, supra note 16, § 555.
26 See, e.g., In re Harzel's Will, 43 l. App. 2d 118, 192 N.E.2d 697 (1963).
27 See, e.g., Peach v. First Natl Bank, 247 Ala. 463, 25 So. 2d 153 (1946); Matter
of Whipple, 19 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1940). See also A. Scorr, supra note 19, § 171, n.1.
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managementYs Every rationale leads to the same general rule of nondel-
egability of investment discretion.29
Judicial decisions have made very few inroads into the well-entrenched
rule of nondelegation. Several courts have allowed trustees to circumvent
the rule by labeling a trustee's action the procurement of investment ad-
vice, rather than the delegation of investment discretion. In Attorney
General v. Olsen,3 0 five trustees were empowered to sell certain trust
real estate and stock and to invest the proceeds. The income was to be
accumulated until a sum sufficient to build a museum was acquired. Since
none of the trustees possessed investment expertise, they entered into an
agency agreement with a local bank. The bank was to "act as custodian
of the securities, advise the trustees as to investments and handle the
bookkeeping for the trust." 31 Because of this delegation of authority and
other irregularities, the attorney general brought suit to remove the trus-
tees. 3 2 The trial court found the agency agreement to be a delegation of
the trustees' investment duties. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts reversed this finding, reasoning that the trustees did not abrogate
their duties, but rather properly sought expert advice. 33 The Restatement
position is similar: as long as the trustee makes the final decision, obtain-
ing investment advice does not constitute delegation.3 4 The position taken
by the Restatement may ultimately be adopted by a majority of courts.
At least two other jurisdictions concur with Massachusetts' position
concerning the trustee's ability to seek investment advice. 35 There is au-
28 A. SCOTT, supra note 19, § 171.2.
29 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 171, comment h (1959).
30 346 Mass. 190, 191 N.E.2d 132 (1963).
31 Id. at 193, 191 N.E.2d at 134.
32 Since charitable trusts have no specified beneficiaries, there can be no suit by the
beneficiaries to force the trustee to act. For enforcement of the charitable trustee's
obligations, the law has placed the responsibility on the state attorney general. G.
BOGERT, supra note 16, § 411; A. SCOTT, supra note 19, § 391. But cfi. Kutner &
Koven, Charitable Trust Legislation in the Several States, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 411,
423 (1966). Anyone else wishing to sue the trustee must prove special interest to ob-
tain standing. G. BOGERT, supra note 16, § 411; A. SCOTT, supra note 19, § 391. Even
the settlor has generally been held not to possess the requisite special interest, al-
though one court has apparently altered the rule. Lokey v. Texas Methodist Founda-
tion, 479 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. 1972). It has shown, however, that attorneys general seem
to concentrate on the more obvious breaches of fiduciary duty, rather than on im-
proving the efficiency of trust investments. See M. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 4, at
328-29.
33 Specifically, the court found that:
None of the trustees had had much, if any, experience in the field of
investments, and it was entirely proper for them to seek expert advice.
The record reveals that the trustees were consulted on the investments
made and gave their approval to such investments .... While a trustee
cannot surrender to another his duties with respect to investments, he
may seek the advice of those better qualified. That is what was done
here .... The agent's power over investments was subject to the ap-
proval of the trustees ....
346 Mass. at 197, 191 N.E.2d at 136. Contra, City of Boston v. Curley, 276 Mass.
549, 177 N.E. 557 (1931); Winthrop v. Attorney General, 128 Mass. 258 (1880).
34 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 171, comment f. (1959).
35 In re Sellers' Estate, 31 Del. Ch. 158, 67 A.2d 860 (1949); In re Greata's Will,
172 Misc. 955, 17 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1939). See also A. Scorr, supra note 19, § 188.3.
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thority, however, refusing to permit such advice by characterizing it as an
improper delegation.30 , Therefore, regarding the trustee's ability to seek
investment advice, there is a division of authority,3 7 but the case law is
not extensive and perhaps is inconclusive.38
An alternative limitation on the rule of nondelegation is judicial ability
to alter the purposes of charitable trusts and to permit administrative
modifications. The power to change purposes is known as cy pres,39 and
the power to modify trust administration is derived from the "doctrine
of deviation. '40 However, these limitations have not been regularly used
to restrict the rule of nondelegation because not all states accept them, 41
and the states which have adopted the limitations apply them in widely
divergent manners. 42
Furthermore, the purpose of these doctrines is simply to solve internal
problems of the trust, that is, those created by the trust instrument. Nei-
ther is designed to alter a rule imposed by the courts in the absence of
specific provisions in the instrument creating the trust.43
It is, therefore, unlikely that the natural person trustee will be able to
escape the rule of nondelegation simply by means of a petition to the state
court. Nevertheless, although the common law rules appear to pose some
problems for the individual trustee, they could best be described as an
inconvenience, causing the often inexperienced trustee to devote a con-
siderable amount of his time to the planning of trust investments.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969,44 however, has placed new and signif-
36 In re Gutman's Estate, 171 Misc. 680, 14 N.Y.S.2d 473 (1937).
37 Horowitz, Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, 41 WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 n.18 (1966).
38 Haskell, Some Problems With the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, 32 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 168 n.26 (1967).
39 G. BOGERT, supra note 16, § 394.
40 Id. The distinction between these doctrines is not always clear:
Sometimes an order which merely relieves the trustee of a handicap-
ping limitation found in the trust instrument or merely permits the
trustee to use funds to forward the original purposes of the trust in
new ways is called the use of cy pres; whereas in reality it is a de-
parture from the prescribed methods of operation without in any way
varying the end results which the donor envisaged. While the effects
of using these two powers are similar, the procedure, formalities, and
evidence required for the use of one power may be different from the
requirements applying to the use of the other power.
id.
41 D. YOUNG & W. MOORE, supra note 4, at 29-30. The use of these doctrines may
be described as follows:
Not all American legal jurisdictions even recognize the cy pres doctrine,
though in some the doctrine of deviation has been extended to include
a change of purpose ....
Among those jurisdictions where the courts at least nominally recog-
nize the cy pres doctrine, or will extend the doctrine of deviation to
include purpose, there is a substantial variation in the willingness of
the courts actually to exercise discretionary powers. Strict construction,
both as to purpose and as to procedure, is the general rule.
ld.
42 Id.
43 G. BOGERT, supra note 16, § 394.
44 83 Stat. 487 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.)
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icant restrictions on the trustee. These restrictions take the form of taxes
upon certain activities of private foundations. 45 One such tax encourages
a foundation -to distribute to charity all of its investment income. 46 Con-
gress attempted to assure this result by fixing a minimum amount which
must be distributed annually. In the Tax Reform Act this amount was set
at 6 percent 47 of the fair market value of the foundation's assets. 48 Fail-
ure to pay out to charity at least this amount results in an initial tax of
15 percent of the undistributed income. 49 If the foundation fails to pay
out the minimum amount after the initial tax is levied against it, a tax of
100 percent of the undistributed income is assessed.; 0
This tax presupposes the trustee's involvement in one of three possible
situations. First, the trustee could achieve a 6 percent investment return
and distribute this amount, less taxes,51 to charity. This action would
constitute compliance with the statute. A second possibility is that the
trustee manages to achieve a return of more than 6 percent. The excess
in this case can not be accumulated, for it is the higher of the minimum
investment return or adjusted net income which must be distributed. 2
Thus a foundation must distribute all its investment income.53 Finally,
45 The Tax Reform Act has made the distinction between charitable trusts and
nonexempt trusts, all of whose interests are devoted to charitable purposes, largely
unimportant. "A trust which is not exempt from tax under section 501(a)" and which
devotes its interest to "religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational pur-
poses" and for which a deduction was allowed is to be treated in the same way as an
exempt organization. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 170(c)(2)(B), 4947(a). Both kinds
of trusts are deemed to be "private foundations." INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 509(a).
This treatment prevents taxpayers from circumventing the restrictions which the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 imposed on exempt charitable trusts by using the nonexempt
trust form. See GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 88
(Comm. Print 1970) [hereinafter cited as GENERAL EXPLANATION].
46 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 4942.
47 Id. § 4942(e)(3).
48 Id. § 4942(e)(1). Six percent is the multiple originally set by Congress in the
Tax Reform Act of 1969. However, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, pursuant
to the power granted him in Section 4942(e)(3), has twice changed the multiple. See
Treas. Reg. §§ 53.4942(a)(2)(c)(5)(a)-(b) (1973); Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(a)(2)(c)(5)(a)
(ii) (1973). These changes supposedly correspond to the original multiple of 6 percent
since any determination of the multiple by the Commissioner "shall bear a relationship
to 6 percent which the Secretary or his delegate determines to be comparable to the
relationship which the money rates and investment yields for the calendar year im-
mediately preceding the beginning of the taxable year bear to the money rates and
investment yields for the calendar year 1969." § 4942(e)(3). If these ,Iew multiples
do correspond to the original 6 percent multiple in reflecting current market condi-
tions, the discussion in the text concerning the effect of the original multiple should
be equally applicable to the multiples for 1973.
49 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 4942(a).
50 ld. § 4942(b).
51 Id. § 4942(d)
52 Id. § 4942(d)(1).
53 This statement must be qualified somewhat, since there is a limited carryover
provision. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 4942(i). The Staff of the Joint Committee on
Internal Revenue Taxation described this exception as follows:
A[n] . . . exception is provided where a private foundation distributes
more than the minimum required payout in a given year. Such excess
distributions may be applied against required payouts in the next 5
years.
GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 45, at 38.
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the trustee may fail to achieve an amount equal to the fixed minimum
investment return. For example, he may invest too heavily in growth
stocks. Nevertheless, the trustee must distribute the statutory minimum to
charity. Such a distribution may frequently require reaching into the
trust's corpus. 54
A second potential tax liability results from the federal embodiment of
the prudent man rule. 5 A tax is imposed on any foundation and its man-
agers which invest "any amount in such a manner as to jeopardize the
carrying out of any of its exempt purposes.";, The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue has explained this phrase in language reminiscent of
Harvard College v. A mory:5
[A]n investment shall be considered to jeopardize the carry-
ing out of the exempt purposes of a private foundation if it is de-
termined that the foundation managers, in making such invest-
ment, have failed to exercise ordinary business care and pru-
dence, under the facts and circumstances prevailing at the time,
in providing for the long and short-term financial needs of the
foundation to carry out its exempt purposes5 s
If found guilty of violating this standard, both the trust and its trustees
suffer. The initial tax on the foundation is 5 percent of the amount im-
prudently invested.-9 The initial tax on any foundation manager who
knowingly participates in such investment is also 5 percent of that
amount.60 Failure to correct this investment results in an additional tax
of 25 percent on the foundation and 5 percent on any uncooperative
foundation manager. 61  A trustee who imprudently handles trust
funds not only faces liability for violation of the common law prudent
man rule, but he also may incur potentially crippling tax liability, both
personally and on behalf of the trust. The Act imposes a $5,000
ceiling on the trustee's initial liability and a $10,000 ceiling on the trus-
tee's liability for failure to correct the jeopardizing investment.6 2 There
is no limit on the liability of the trust. Despite this ceiling, the trustee's
liability can exceed $15,000, for the trust may seek indemnification from
the trustee for its tax liability because of imprudent investment. Such in-
demnification is made possible by the common law rule that the trustee's
54 See GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 45, at 37. The effect of Section 4942 was
described as follows:
[Section 4942] . . . does not mean that a foundation may not make low
yield investments if it so desires. However, if it does so it is likely that
the foundation will find either that it periodically must sell shares to
enable it to meet the payout requirements or that it must distribute
shares to public charities in partial satisfaction of those requirements.
Id.
55 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 4944.
56 Id. § 4944(a).
5T See notes 15-18 and accompanying text supra.
58 4 P-H 1974 FED. TAXES 34,976.5. See note 16 supra.
59 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 4944(a)(1).
60 Id. § 4944(a)(2).
61 Id. § 4944(b).
62 Id. § 4944(d)(2).
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negligence or misconduct concerning investments, such as a violation of
the prudent investment rule, 6:3 is a breach of fiduciary duty.64 For this
breach of fiduciary duty, the trustee's liability for money damages de-
pends on the principle -that the injured party is to be put in .the position
he would have been in had the trustee not breached his duty.65 Thus,
theoretically, the trustee, through indemnification, can be made to bear
the entire burden of the taxes imposed on foundations by the Tax Reform
Act of 1969.66
The same theory of indemnification can be applied to the trustee who
invest too heavily in growth stocks, thus achieving a low investment yield
and requiring a distribution of part of the corpus to satisfy the minimum
distribution requirements of the Internal Revenue Code. 67 The recovery
in this case would be the amount by which the trust was forced to reduce
its corpus in order to satisfy the distribution requirements.
The trustee thus faces a serious problem. The type of investments
which he selects will have to return a sum equal to the Internal Revenue
Code's minimum investment return. If this amount is fixed at a percent-
age of the trust's assets necessitating investment in securities which have a
high yield in current markets,68 the trustee may be forced into an invest-
ment portfolio that inadequately provides for the future development of
the trust. Such a portfolio might subject the trustee to liability for violating
the prudent man rule,6' with the financial burden ultimately coming to
63See Lynch v. John M. Redfield Foundation, 9 Cal. App. 3d 293, 88 Cal. Rptr.
87 (1970). The court stated:
We are satisfied . . . that the directors failed to meet the standards of
the prudent investor rule .... There is substantial evidence of good
faith and the trial court so found. But good faith is no defense in an
action based on negligence.
Id. at 301-02, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
64 G. BOGERT, supra note 16, § 862 n.56.
65 Id. § 701 n.20.
66 Apparently this theory of indemnification has not been used to hold the trustee
liable for the increased tax liabilities of the trust caused by his negligent investment,
although it is a recognized remedy for losses caused by the trustee's violation of the
common law prudent man rule. See Lynch v. John M. Redfield Foundation, 9 Cal.
App. 3d 293, 88 Cal. Rptr. 87 (1970).
This lack of authority does not present an insurmountable obstacle to an indemnifi-
cation remedy, however. Both the common law rule and the federal statute establish
a similar standard for trustee investments. See notes 15-18, 55-62 and accompanying
text supra. Furthermore, the policy which produced both rules is the same: the pro-
tection of the trust from a trustee's speculative investments. In Harvard College v.
Armory, the court emphasized the need to consider the "probate safety of the capital"
as well as the "probable income." 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, 461 (1830). Similarly, in
enacting the new tax liabilities for imprudent investment, "the Congress determined
that investments which jeopardize the foundation's corpus should not be permitted."
GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 45, at 46. Since the policy and the standard of
both rules are similar, violation of either rule would probably be treated as negligence
on the part of the trustee, thus making him liable to the trust for taxes or losses which
resulted from his breach of fiduciary duty.
67 See notes 46-54 and accompanying text supra. See also INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
§ 4942.6 8 See note 48 supra.
69 See notes 15-18, 55-62 and accompanying text supra.
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rest on the trustee alone.70 On the other hand, if the trustee tries to
provide for the future of the trust but fails to generate an adequate cur-
rent investment yield, he may be forced to meet the minimum payout
requirements by invading the trust corpus. Again, it is possible for ulti-
mate liability to be placed upon the trustee. 71
The extent of the trustee's potential liability underlines the necessity
for investment expertise in the management of a charitable trust portfolio.
However, in many instances, 72 such expertise can be utilized only by
delegating the trustee's investment discretion.
I1. DELEGATION: PRO AND CON
A. Arguments for Delegation
After completing a study of the rules governing directors of charitable
corporations and trustees of charitable trusts, the American Bar Associa-
tion's Section on Real Property, Probate and Trust Law concluded that
delegation of investment powers is needed in the operation of many char-
ities, whether they are corporations or trusts, because the trust rule seems
unduly restrictive.7 3 Critics of the status quo have advanced three argu-
ments which support this conclusion in its application to investments.
First, it has been argued that most restrictions on the power of trustees
are outmoded and ill-suited to present needs, since the type of trust for
which the rules were designed no longer exists. 74 Thus, evolution in the
70 See notes 62-66 and accompanying text supra.
71 See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
72 See notes 6-12 and accompanying text supra.
73 Committee on Charitable Trusts, Duties of Charitable Trust Trustees and Chari-
table Corporation Directors, in 2 ABA REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST J.
545, 564 (1967).
74 See Fratcher, Trustees' Powers Legislation, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 627 (1962). The
historical evolution of trusts has been described as follows:
[T]he rules were crystallized two centuries ago by precedents developed
in the interpretation of the terms of trusts of that period. These were
primarily settlements of ancestral land made by the heads of great
English families . . . . [U]sually trustees were introduced only for the
purposes of preserving contingent remainders, protecting the eldest son
during minority and raising portions for daughters and younger sons.
With such trusts, narrow construction of express powers and reluctance
to find implied powers were beneficial to the primogenitary heir and
ordinarily reflected the true intention of the settlor. The principal
purpose of the settlement was to keep the ancestral land in the family
and to preserve it in the condition in which it had been received from
the settlor's ancestors.
In this country today trusts are commonly created for the investment
and active management of a fund. The settlor is not interested in keep-
ing particular land or other property in the family or in preserving its
ancient condition. He ordinarily intends that the trustee shall have all
the powers needed for efficient and economical management with a view
to the production of adequate income and enhancement of the principal
for the benefit of the cestuis qui trust. The application of the old re-
strictive rules to this type of trust tends to thwart the real intention of
the settlor by depriving the trustee of powers essential to the achieve-
ment of the settlor's true purposes.
Id. at 658.
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subject matter and purposes of the trust has not been matched by a
corresponding development of trust law. Consequently, some restrictions,
such as nondelegation of discretionary functions, may have ceased to serve
the purpose for which they were originally intended.
A second argument in favor of delegation is based on the allegedly in-
adequate investment management of charitable foundations. Foundations'
investment returns have been significantly below average when compared
with other investment funds,7 5 and one of the major factors cited as
responsible for this phenomenon is that ".the managers of the foundations
have not given a high priority to the effective management of the
funds."7 6 The solution advocated by critics is not for the trustee :to devote
more of his time to investments, but rather for the investments of charit-
able trusts to be managed by professionals. Furthermore, the need for
professional expertise has become especially acute because of the imposi-
tion of minimum distribution requirements by the Tax Reform Act of
1969.
7 7
A third argument advanced in support of delegation rests upon a pre-
mise which conflicts with that of the preceding argument. This premise
is that trustees spend too much time solving investment problems and not
enough in distributing trust income to charity.78 The trustee who devotes
most of his time to management of the investment portfolio of the trust
may not make a very efficient distribution of ,the trust income. He may
simply not have much time left to investigate adequately the projects and
people to whom he distributes the trust's income. Much waste and ineffi-
ciency can occur. 79 If responsibility for trust investments could be shifted
75 See, e.g., COMM'N ON FOUNDATIONS, supra note 3, at 74-75, comparing the
investment performance of charitable foundations with that of mutual funds.
76 The Commission found four factors influencing the poor investment perfor-
mances of foundations. Aside from the inadequate attention g iven to trust manage-
ment, the other factors are the prudent man rule, a high percentage of foundation assets
consisting of controlling stock interests in a single corporation, and legal restrictions
in the trust instrument upon selling certain securities. Id. at 75. See also, Murray,
Foundation Investments: Problems of Investment Policy, in 10 N.Y.U. CONFERENCE
ON CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS 29 (H. Sellin ed. 1971).
77 Heimann, Discussion of the Peterson Commission Report, in 10 N.Y.U. CON-
FERENCE ON CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS 19 (H. Sellin ed. 1971). The reason for the
distribution requirement has been described as follows:
The subject of investment management has not been given adequate
attention. And it isn't just a question of more detailed supervision by
trustees. As in the management of university portfolios, what we are
suggesting is that foundation investment ought to receive continuing
professional management. The importance of the payout requirement is
that it imposes an external discipline which will insure that adequate
attention is given to investment management.
Id. at 21. But see B. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET (1973); N.Y.
Times, Jan. 17, 1974, at 56, col 5.
78 See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, REPORT ON PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 53 (Senate Finance Comm. Print 1965).
79 The problem has been noted by the Treasury Department:
Foundation trustees or directors who attempt to predict hourly, daily
or weekly market fluctuations, who purchase puts, calls and straddles
in an effort to profit from these fluctuations, who shift their positions
in securities frequently, and who endeavor to assay the potentialities
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to professional investment counsel, the trustee would be free to devote
himself -to distributing the trust's proceeds more carefully than is possible
under the present system.
Whether one accepts the argument that the present rule has outlived
its purpose, or that the trustee spends too little time managing investment
funds, or that he spends too much, delegation of his investment function
seems to offer an acceptable solution to the investment problems of the
charitable trustee.
B. Arguments Against Delegation
The arguments in favor of allowing delegation of investment authority
by trustees have not received unanimous acceptance. Three objections to
the idea of abolishing the present rule of nondelegation have been raised.
Winthrop v. Attorney General," which first articulated the rule of non-
delegation, justified its holding primarily on the grounds that delegation of
investment discretion violated the settlor's intent."' Under this view,
delegation is thought to neutralize the choice of the settlor, a choice which
involved the settlor's assessment of a trustee's ability and discretion regard-
ing matters such as sensitive family relations s2 This reasoning has ev-
idently lost none of its persuasiveness, for it is still advanced in defense of
the nondelegation rule."" While this logic may be persuasive with respect
to noncharitable trustees and their responsibilities to the settlor's family,
it loses much of its force when applied to charitable trustees.8 4 In fact,
the Tax Reform Act of 1969 penalizes almost all transactions between the
foundation and a "substantial contributor" or members of his family.8 5
of untried businesses, the worth of untested mineral land, or the future
value of- unproven building locations must necessarily expend con-
siderable amounts of time and attention in those endeavors. Little scope
is likely to remain for charity. Charitable enterprises deserve-indeed,
they require-analysis, evaluation, planning; they are not matters to be
lightly undertaken or perfunctorily carried on; they merit the genuine
interest and undivided attention of the persons to whom society has
entrusted their accomplishment. Consequently, the efforts of the specu-
lator or the trader . . . are intrinsically inconsistent with proper man-
agement of the affairs of a foundation.
Id.
80 128 Mass. 258 (1880).
81 128 Mass. at 261. See also Hallgring, The Uniform Trustees' Powers Act and
the Basic Principles oj Fiduciary Responsibility, 41 WASH. L. REV. 801 (1966). The
author observes:
The duty not to delegate derives from the nature of the trust relation-
ship, not from the terms of the trust instrument. It recognizes that a
settlor often selects a trustee because of personal confidence in him.
Because a settlor has confidence in the ability of a given person to in-
vest his money, we can not infer that he wishes to subject his estate
to the decisions of some agent selected by that person, even in good
faith.
Id. at 831-32.
82 Hallgring, supra note 81, at 832.
83 id.
84 Cf. note 74 supra.
85 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 4941.
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Furthermore, charitable trusts, because of their exemption from the rule
against perpetuities, may continue indefinitely.8 6 Even if personal con-
siderations about the trustee's investment ability influenced the settlor's
original choice, the trust and its needs will outlast the original trustee, and
a successor may be chosen by the court on a different basis than the one
the settlor used; for example, the successor trustee may not possess the
same background for dealing with the members of the settlor's family.
Therefore, it is unlikely that a settlor would choose a charitable trustee
because of the trustee's expected ability to deal with family matters.
Finally, in analyzing the validity of this objection to delegation, one
might ask how a solution which may both improve a trust's investment
return and increase the effectiveness of its disbursements could possibly
violate the intent of the charitable donor. In regard to the administration
of his gift, the settlor's sole intention would seem to be that the trustee
manage the corpus in the most efficient way. If delegation would increase
the efficiency of trust administration, it could not conflict with the pur-
pose of the donor. Thus, the objection :that delegation does not comport
with the intent of the settlor is unpersuasive in the setting of charitable
trusts.
A second objection to delegation by the natural person charitable
trustee is also derived from an inference about the settlor's intent. It has
been argued that since the settlor could have selected a corporate trustee,
which has the power to delegate its investment discretion, his selection of
the natural person trustee evidences an intent that the trustee should
have no power to delegate. Furthermore, if this difference in the powers
of various trustees were to be eliminated, a certain flexibility inherent in
the present system would be lost. 87 However, it is not at all clear that the
choice of form reflects the settlor's intent as to the applicable law. 88 Addi-
tionally, the conclusion that delegation would result in the destruction of
the present system's flexibility presumes the inability of the settlor to de-
lineate the trustee's powers in the trust instrument. Yet, a settlor could
vrovide for delegation of investment authority in the trust instrument and
present courts would enforce it. 89 It is only in the absence of an express
grant of delegation power that present law does not allow the trustee to
delegate. The solution to the problems suggested by this objection
to delegation is simply a matter of careful drafting of the trust instrument.
A final objection to delegation of investment management by the charit-
able trustee is that delegation will undermine the trustee's liability for
improper investments since the present liability would be imposed on the
trustee's agent. 90 The relative lack of effective state control over the in-
86 G. BOGERT, supra note 16, § 391. A. ScoTr, supra note 19, § 62.19(f), at 365.
87 See Committee on Charitable Trusts, Duties of Charitable Trust Trustees and
Charitable Corporation Directors, in 2 ABA REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST
LAW J. 546 (1967).
88 Id.
89 Martin, Settlor's Rights to Authorize Trustees to Delegate Investment Decision
to Investment Counsel, 60 ILL. BAR J. 392, 393 (1972). See also Haskell, supra note
38, at 169.
90 Hallgring, supra note 81, at 833.
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vestment activities of charitable trusts compounds the problem.' As a
result, it is feared that the standards of trustee conduct will be lowered. 9 '
Even if the trustee is allowed to delegate investment management, he
would not be permitted to delegate all of his trust responsibilities,9" and
the trustee's liability for misconduct would remain the same in all areas
except investment. Thus, control of the trustee by the attorney general
probably would not diminish significantly if delegation were allowed. Ad-
ditionally, although the trustee will not be directly responsible for par-
ticular investments, he will retain an indirect responsibility for all of them
because of his duty to use reasonable care in his choice of investment
managers. 94 He has a further duty to generally supervise the activity of
the agent.9 5 Since the trustee will be receiving the income realized from
the trust's assets in order to disburse it, he will have an excellent oppor-
tunity to determine if the agents are performing competently, and if the
trustee is negligent in his appraisal of the investment advisor's effective-
ness, he will be liable for breach of trust.
While the attorney general would have to supervise investment
agents if he desires to maintain control over charitable trust investments,
the trustee need not be freed from all scrutiny. Trustees would probably
delegate their investment authority to financially responsible agents like
banks and trust companies. Therefore, the attorney general could have a
larger fund out of which to collect damages for improper investment.
C. Delegation as a Solution
Changing the present rule of nondelegation is likely to produce better
investment of trust funds since investment will be handled by those with
expertise. Equally beneficial will be the more effective use of funds as
the trustee concentrates on efficient distribution of money to charity and
deserving beneficiaries. When considering both the reasons for and objec-
tions to the delegation of the charitable trustee's investment function,
delegation emerges as a feasible and practical solution to the problems of
the natural person charitable trustee.
III. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Various approaches have been suggested to change the present rule of
nondelegation. These proposals can be placed into two general categories:
the drafting solution and the legislative solutions.
91 See note 32 supra.
92 See Hallgring, supra note 81, at 833-36 for a discussion of the results of dele-
gation permitted under the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act. See also note 105 infra.
93 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 171(c) (1959):
The trustee cannot properly commit the entire administration of the
trust to an agent or co-trustee or other person, unless he is permitted to
do so by the terms of the trust.
94 Id. § 225(2)(c), at 522.
95 Id. § 225(2)(c), at 522.
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A. The Drafting Solution
One solution to the charitable trustee's problems would involve no
change in existing law, for a clause permitting delegation can be included
in every trust instrument and will be upheld by the courts. 96 This remedy
would require careful drafting of the trust instrument since an overly
broad grant of power may be voided by a court as contrary to public
policy.97 Yet, if the instrument is well drafted and the trustee can show
that a prudent investor would have delegated in similar circumstances. 9
the courts will permit delegation.99 However, the drafting solution pro-
vides no relief for the unfortunate trustee whose trust instrument does not
contain a delegation provision. A second drawback of this approach is that
it overlooks the fact that even the most careful draftsmen make mistakes.
If counsel should erroneously omit the delegation clause from the instru-
ment, the trustee would still find it necessary to conform to the current
rule of nondelegation. Therefore, while certainly a possible solution to
the trustee's delegation problems, the drafting proposal is an incomplete
one.
B. Legislative Solutions
To afford all trustees the advantages of delegation, legislative inter-
vention would be necessary. The legislation could take the form of a stat-
ute which would provide the natural person charitable trustee with the
option of delegating investment management if a prudent man would do
so.100 A possible model for this kind of legislation is a California statute
which allows the directors of nonprofit corporations to delegate investment
authority. 10 1 Even the method of adopting a specific statute is not with-
out difficulties. Charitable trust law is cluttered with narrow legislative
directives, 102 and the practice of enacting a specific statute for each trust
problem as it comes to the attention of the lawmakers has been criticized
as producing "an unsatisfactory patchwork" of legislation. 0 3 More piece-
meal legislation can only add to the confusion. 10 4
The objection to adding another item to the legislative catalogue of
remedies must be weighed against the alternatives. The drafting of a trust
96 Martin, supra note 89, at 392-93.
97 Id. at 394-95.
98 See notes 15-18 and accompanying text supra.
99 Martin, supra note 89, at 394-95; Haskell, supra note 38, at 169.
100 See notes 20-22 and accompanying text supra.
101 The relevant provision reads:
The directors or trustees of any such common trust fund, or trust funds,
so organized, may employ such officers or agents as they think best,
define their duties, and fix their compensation. They may also appoint
a trust company or bank as custodian of the trust estate and may em-
ploy an investment advisor or advisors, define their duties and fix their
compensation.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 10250(b) (West 1955).
102 Haskell, supra note 38, at 168.
103 Id.
104 An alternative to piecemeal alterations to present laws is the complete revision
of a state's trust law, including a provision allowing delegation of investment author-
ity by charitable trustees. Support for such a revision is evidenced by the promulga-
tion of two uniform trust acts, both of which contain provisions allowing delegation.
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instrument to permit delegation is an incomplete solution'; for it would
not prevent the trustee from suffering from the mistake or omission of the
draftsman.' 0 6 On the other hand, a statute would alter the law applic-
able to all trustees by a single act, rather than depending upon case by
case adjudication. 10 Enactment of a specific statute is not a perfect solu-
tion, but, when balanced against the flaws in competing proposals, it
seems to offer the most sensible approach to this problem.
IV. CONCLUSION
The common law rule of nondelegation"I s combined with the effects
of the prudent investor rule and the foundation reforms of the Tax Re-
form Act of 19691'1 place the natural person charitable trustee in an
untenable position. Delegation of the trustee's discretionary function of
investment selection will not only benefit him by freeing him from the
threat of potential liability, but will also result in more efficient adminis-
tration of charitable trusts. The ultimate beneficiary of legislation which
permits delegation in appropriate cases will not be the trustee. Rather,
delegation will encourage a better allocation of charitable resources, bene-
fiting society generally, as settlors intend.
-Richard B. Urda, Jr.
See UNIFORM TRUSTEES' POWERS ACT § 3(c)(24); UNIFORM MANAGEMENT OF INSTI-
TUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 5. The latter only applies to institutional trustees. UNIFORM
MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 1(a). However, the Trustees' Powers
Act allows individual trustees to
employ persons, including attorneys, auditors, investment advisors, or
agents, even if they are associated with the trustee, to advise or assist in
the performance of his administrative duties; to act without independent
investigation upon their recommendations; and instead of acting per-
sonally, to employ one or more agents to perform any act of admini-
stration, whether or not discretionary.
UNIFORM TRUSTEES' POWERS ACT § 3(c)(24). The primary limitation on this act as a
solution to the problem of delegation is the fact that it is a comprehensive revision
of the law as it applies to natural person trustees. Many provisions of the act have
provoked strong criticism by commentators. See Haskell, supra note 38, passim;
Hallgring, supra note 81, passim. It thus appears that a single statute, specifically
directed toward the natural person trustee's current problems in regard to the dele-
gation of investment discretion, is more feasible than the attempt to bring about
enactment of a uniform act.
105 See Part III A supra.
106 See Haskell, supra note 38, at 169. Haskell observes:
It may well be said that the law as it presently stands, to the extent that
it is restrictive of fiduciary power where freedom of fiduciary action is
desirable, or to the extent that the existence or nonexistence of such
power is in doubt, only serves to penalize those whose counsel did not
anticipate the particular power that subsequently seemed to be called
for.
Id. See also Part III A supra.
107 See notes 30-43 and accompanying text supra. Furthermore, the legislature
would not have to enact reforms of other aspects of trust law to change the delega-
tion rule. The statute would deal with only the specific investment dilemma of the
natural person charitable trustee and not grant him powers inappropriate or useless
to his administration. The limited purpose of the statute enhances its chances of
political acceptability. See note 104 supra.
108 See notes 19-29 and accompanying text supra.
109 See notes 15-18, 44-72 and accompanying text supra.
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